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Never Ending Brotherhood? Seeking Peace Solutions of Indonesia – Malaysia Confrontation, 1963-1966

ABSTRACT: Confrontation events, that occurred in 1963-1966, between Indonesia against Malaysia, were a unique event. This is because the conflict at that time differs from the prevalence of conflict or war between states in general. The focus of this study is to examine the relationship between Indonesia-Malaysia during the confrontation era, 1963-1966. The main focus is the process of resolving the confrontation. This research is a qualitative study by using historical methods and structurist approaches. The resolved of conflict between the two countries was interesting, because the conflict also involved forces outside, such as Britain and the USA (United States of America), can be resolved in a short time rather than through formal meetings, but can be resolved amicably, preceded by a number of secret meetings of both parties involved directly, without going through the mediator. The results concluded that there are two factors that pushed the end of confrontation, namely: separation of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965 and the 30 September 1965 movement in Indonesia. Both of these events can be said to be intertwined and become the main factor of change in the attitude of the two countries related confrontation. In addition, conflict resolution can occur due to the emergence of actors in both countries with a view to the equation could change things, which have been inhibiting and destabilizing both countries and the region as well. Another important thing is secret meetings established early in the settlement process confrontation by utilizing a network of friends and fraternity.

KEY WORDS: Brotherhood; Confrontation; Indonesia and Malaysia; British and USA; Peace Solutions.

INTRODUCTION

Confrontation events, that occurred in 1963-1966, between Indonesia against Malaysia, were a unique event (Hindley, 1964; Mackie, 1974; Poulgrain, 1998; Mahmud, 2000; and Sunarti, 2013). This is because the conflict at that time differs from the prevalence of conflict/war between states in

general. Based on the definition of the war, the war was an armed conflict between two sovereign states (Holsti, 1996:1).

While Carl von Clausewitz (1940), a philosopher of war from Germany, defines war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” (Clausewitz, 1940). War is like a duel, but on a large

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scale. In general, war is a real armed conflict, deliberate, and extensive that occurs between two or more political communities hostile (Howard, 2002; and Lindell, 2009).

The war can be carried out simultaneously in several different fields. In each field, there can be one or more successive military campaigns. One military campaign includes not only fighting, but also intelligence, troop movement, supplies the needs of food and weapons, propaganda, and others. Conflicts in a row is called a battle (Keegan, 1993; and Cohen, 1994).

Related to the common definition of the war, this confrontation can be said not to be an open war. Indonesia-Malaysia conflict is a combination of diplomatic pressure, press campaigns, and threats of military power with limited military infiltration in the border region (Ott, 1971; and Bhataacharjee, 1976). In the confrontation, never open wide-scale fighting, military conflict occurs only on a limited scale. This conflict statements preceded war demonstrations that have more political aspects, then continues to the economic and military aspects in a limited scale. In the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation of the more prominent is the political dimension (Berding, 1966; Gordon, 1966; Parmer, 1967; and Chopra, 1974/1975).

Although open war never broke out, the conflict between the two countries is a serious concern internationally, because of the conflict occurred when the political situation in the world is experiencing tension as a result of the advent of the Cold War began to spread to Southeast Asia was marked by the emergence of Communist forces of China and the outbreak the Vietnam war. The conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia feared could increase tensions and bring political instability region (Brackman, 1966; Cantori & Spiegel, 1970; Agung, 1973; Desai, 1981; Saravanamuttu, 1982; and Mezerick, 2000).

Numerous diplomatic efforts made by various parties, such as the UN (United Nations), the USA (United States of America), Japan, and Thailand, but did not produce positive results. Moving on from the failure of diplomatic efforts were facilitated by the

countries above, then comes a variety of secret diplomatic efforts of the two warring sides, negotiating directly without involving a third party as before. Initiative to end the conflict comes from internal elements in both countries, and both are negotiating through means of kinship; this is done in order to bridge the differences that occur, with likens the conflict as a big family quarrel that must be resolved by themselves.

Both nations can finally resolve the conflicts peacefully by the process quick and easy. Though not as the only factor is the driving factor conflict ended peacefully, because there are other factors that also play an important role as the occurrence of several events domestically and regionally, informal approach can be seen as one part of which is contributed important expedite the process of negotiations to end the conflict.

Many observers wonder, the years of conflict that is hateful with terms such as "crush Malaysia" and also clash serious military on the border of Kalimantan, finished in a two-day meeting between Foreign Minister Adam Malik of Indonesia and Foreign Minister Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia in Bangkok, Thailand, even without any termination of the agreement signed with the clear (*Straits Time*, 10/6/1966).

It would be different if the conflict involves two states that do not have the ties of kinship. These countries would ask for clear guarantees that the same event will not be valid anymore. In the Indonesian conflict with China, for example, the New Order government (1966-1998) in Indonesia is not willing to open diplomatic relations with the country until the Chinese state formally that they no longer support the Communist movements in Indonesia (Kroef, 1986; and Muas, 2015).

Based on the above background, the author is interested to examine deeply about the process to ends Indonesia-Malaysia conflict known as *Konfrontasi*. This study is focused on the process of conflict resolution, which will examine in more detail how the process of the settlement of the case.

The author chose the subject of the settlement process based on the *Konfrontasi*

by several things. *First*, I look at the process of resolving the confrontation as something that is interesting to study more deeply, because this conflict has dragged many parties, both military involvement, such as the UK (United Kingdom), Australia, and New Zealand; and also of diplomacy, such as the involvement of the United States of America, Japan, and Thailand, it turns out can be solved very simply through direct negotiations between the two countries. *Second*, the relationship changes in the domestic and regional political situation in both countries by the end of the conflict. *Third*, the emergence of the guards reconciliation or peace feelers in both countries, which play an important role as an interloper deadlocks in negotiations.

The main problem that will be the theme of the study is why confrontation must be ended, and how the process of their completion Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation take place? To answer the main question above, I propose four research questions: (1) What are the factors that drive the end of confrontation?; (2) What are the forms and mechanisms to resolve the confrontation?; (3) Why the process goes quickly?; and (4) Who are the actors and how their linkage?

OBJECTIVES, METHODS, AND SOURCES

This study has several objectives to be achieved: (1) Reveal the factors that pushed the end of the confrontation; (2) Explain the forms and mechanisms to resolve the confrontation; (3) Explain why the settlement could take place quickly; and (4) Revealed the role of the actors involved and their linkage.

The results of this study are expected to be useful as follows. Academically, enrich the history of historiography on Indonesian diplomacy and foreign policy of Southeast Asia, especially foreign policy Indonesia and Malaysia. In practice, contribute to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the two countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, which lately easily often ignited by some things that are not understood by the majority of the people of both nations, because of a lack of understanding of the history of relations between the two countries.

This paper is the study of history, the topic of the completion of the confrontation Indonesia-Malaysia. Due to about the relationship of two countries, the research is in the scope of the history of diplomacy. The method used in this research is the historical method, which consists of four stages: *heuristic*, critic, interpretation, and historiography (Kartodirdjo, 1992; Kuntowijoyo, 2005; and Sjamsuddin, 2007).

In the process of data collection and the relevant written sources, the author has conducted bibliographical research. The author conducted research in the library and in the archives in the two countries, Malaysia and Indonesia. The sources were examined in this study, in general, is a source of textual or written, either in the form of primary sources and secondary sources (Dessouki, Hillal & Korany, 1991; and Sjamsuddin, 2007).

A secondary source is generally obtained from books, unpublished sources such as dissertations and theses, and magazines. While the primary source obtained either from primary sources that have been published and unpublished. Primary sources include Malaysia's Foreign Affairs that many contain data on Malaysia's foreign policy, especially concerning the foreign policy of Malaysia towards Indonesia in the period 1964-1966. Then, Parliamentary Debates: People's Council (1958-1970), which contains a lot of data about the sessions of debate in Parliament (People's council) comes to confrontation with Indonesia.

Primary sources that have not been published, which also is the foundation for this study, was obtained from the files of the Public Record Office London in Archives of Malaysia, especially the series FO (Foreign Office) 371, which contains correspondence general of the FO; then series CO (Colonial Office) in 1030, which contains correspondence Southeast Asia Department, as well as the series PREM (Prime Minister)'s Office 13, 1964-1970. Sources of American Foreign Relations, author uses of the United States Vol.XXIII, 1961-1963; and Vol.XXVI, 1964-1968. Related archives of the Foreign Ministry of Indonesia is in the ANRI (*Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia* or National

Archives of the Republic of Indonesia), the author cannot access it.

In addition, there are several primary sources that have been published or that contain the primary elements include Malaysia/Indonesia Relations, 31st August 1957 – 15th September 1963 (Position Description: Kuala Lumpur); set Materials on the issue of Malaysia from 1963 to 1964 (Directorate of Asia Northeast, Department of Foreign Affairs); Diplomatic Confrontation Documents 1965 (Department of Foreign Affairs); and Malaysia Year Book 1966-1967 (The Malay Mail).

Furthermore, other primary sources are newspapers of the two countries, from Indonesia is: *Antara*, *Antara Daily News Bulletin*, *the Asian Recorder*, and *Kompas*; and Malaysian newspaper that has become the reference material is: *Malay Mail*, *Straits Times*, and *Berita Harian*. The author face difficulties in finding sources of documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, the newspaper of *Antara*, the author has found in the National Library in Jakarta, Indonesia, into primary sources is very important for the author to see the process of resolving the confrontation from Indonesian perspective.

APPROACHES AND CONCEPTS

This research is categorized as history of diplomacy. History of diplomacy is the study of the history of the relationship between two or more countries (Nicolson, 1969; and Roy, 1991). According to Akira Iriye (1988) and Saho Matusumoto (1999), methods and approach can be divided into four categories. *First*, the traditional approach of relying on the research towards archives two or more countries. *Second*, the domestic-oriented approach, that takes into account the effect of pressure or social development, economy, and politics in the country towards foreign policy of a country. *Third*, a more systemic approach is to analyze diplomacy of a country in terms of changes in the world as a whole. *Fourth*, the cultural approach or intellectual approach, which sees international relations as an intellectual relationship (Iriye, 1988; and Matusumoto, 1999).

Here, historians are required to understand the culture of the countries studied and compared with each other to understand the perception of one nation towards another nation. The problem of tension between the two countries and the process of completion with all its dynamics requires a more comprehensive approach. Four approaches described by Akira Iriye (1988) and Saho Matusumoto (1999), we cannot just use one of them, but the four can be used to complement each other.

Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation categorized as an international conflict. In the process of settlement of international conflicts, there is some kind of settlement efforts. An international conflict can be resolved through violence or by peaceful means (Wallensteen, 2002; and Wani, Suwirta & Fayeye, 2013). One effort is the political resolution of disputes through a mediation process. Mediation in international disputes is better known as the dispute resolution process involving a third party in its efforts to bring the parties to the dispute so that they can negotiate (Jensen, 1982; and Ury, 2000).

In the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict mediation process through a third-party mediator has been done several times, but did not produce positive results, and the conflict continues. In the current situation, the impasse appears the initiative of the Indonesian military, especially the Army to try to find a solution to resolve to end the conflict (Crouch, 1978; and Jok, 2015).

In an attempt to explain and analyze the emergence of the occupiers of both countries, the author uses structivist approach introduced by the British economic historian, Christopher Lloyd (1993).¹ The approach

¹This approach utilizes specific sociological theories, especially the concepts of "emergency" and "agency". This approach refers to the way of working (structure of reasoning) in the natural sciences, but adapted to the science of history, where data can only be obtained from the relics of the past (historical sources). Said to resemble the natural sciences because, first of all, reality sought not the whole of reality, but only the so-called "causal factor" invisible (unobservable) as well as in natural science, the phenomenon can be seen by the human senses (observable), but the causes of the phenomenon is not visible (unobservable). For example, objects falling down (phenomenon, observable), but the causal mechanism, i.e. invisible gravity (unobservable); sound can be heard, or the TV image can be seen, but the magnetic field that causes it can

aims to show the reality in the form of a “causal factor” uncaught senses. Phenomena, such as rebellion, revolution, social change, and so on, can be captured through the senses, because it is contained in historical sources that can be read and studied. But the causality does not appear empirically in historical sources, because hidden in the unobservable social structures (Llyod, 1993:38).

Theoretically, there is an interaction between people (individuals or groups) and social structures, in which they originated. So to display the “causal factor”, that is unobservable, was a historian who gets the data source from historical sources should be used to analyze the social structure in order to show the interaction between humans concrete or observable and social structures that are not visible or unobservable (Llyod, 1993:39).

In structurist methodology, events and structures are not dichotomous and dualistic, but a tangle of dialectic methodological symbiotic, between the two complement each other as a unified methodology. In the sense that the event contains a power to change the social structure, social structure while containing barriers or encouragement for actions that change. Furthermore, there are stages in this methodology involves analysis of social structure as well as the determination of causality mechanism causing the changes (Llyod, 1993:40).

The social structure is in the form of norms, roles, and interactions arising from the actions and thoughts of men. Human beings are born in a given social structure and has the ability to change the social structure in which it originated (Llyod, 1993:40). This is where structurist confirm the individual's role as a determinant factor in transforming and reproducing social structure changes. Individual (or group of individuals) is, then, referred to as the “agent of change” (cf Llyod, 1993; and Hodgson, 2004).

Because such an important element of an individual or group as an active factor in the methodology of structurist, then this

needs to be explored further. The power to change the social structure was located on what is called the “agency” and “mentalite”. While ontologically, the social structure has also to determine the forces that curb (constraining) and “agent of change”, who are trying to change the structure that has the capability and willingness, to change the social structure (enabling). Interaction and tension between the “agency” that is enabling the social structure which is the principal constraining the structurist methodology (Llyod, 1993:93-100).

After emerging social structure around them, which turned out very restrictive, comes the initiatives and actions of individuals or groups, where the social structure was to make a change. Initiative and the action arises from an agency that has the power to change (enabling). Agency itself is derived from the social structure itself (internal). Later, the agency that is the major driving force in making changes. The emergence of this agency does not come suddenly, but requires a process in accordance with the length of the constraining social structures work. According to Christopher Llyod (1993), the agency is autonomous power of the social structure, but it also represents the ability of a person to act on behalf of others in accordance with certain powers (Llyod, 1993:100).

Based on this, the author would like to see in depth related to the initiative and the breakthrough made by the actors of individuals and groups in the process of breaking the deadlock of negotiations that occurred previously. What kind of situation that could encourage them/those actors to make changes. Through this structurist approach, the author wish to express causal factor of the completion of the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation could be said quickly and easily.

In addition, the author saw there was also an important factor contributing to expediting the process of negotiating an end to confrontation that is the kinship between the two nations. In sociological terms, the fraternal relationship characterized by cultural similarities and also descendants

not be captured by five senses (unobservable). See for further information, Christopher Llyod (1993).

often called kinship (Liow, 2004).

Sometimes people often think this phenomenon is unique, because it is rare in the international community. However, there are actually several countries are related by blood and culture, such as North Korea and South Korea, China and Taiwan, but these countries are still maintaining their individual identity, even bond emotional in these countries has almost disappeared because of the strong socialization as sovereign nations in shaping identity, nationalism, ideology, and other sentiments (Leuzinger, 2014). In other words, these countries do not see the kinship as a major part of a strategic culture that developed them.

As a reality, there is no doubt, there is a kinship between the two countries: Indonesia and Malaysia. Both countries have a blood relation (brotherhood), culture, religion, and family relationships; and, therefore, often referred to as allied countries (Wallenstein, 2002; and Liow, 2004). Malay cultural similarities between the two countries in the felt in almost all areas of "Melayu" (Malay) in Malaysia and in Indonesia, such as Sumatera, Kalimantan, and partly most Sulawesi (Bugis). The people of Indonesian descent, many become citizens and an important person in Malaysia, one of which is the Tun Abdul Razak is a descendant of the Bugis in South Sulawesi (Raymond, 2010).

Based on this, the author also wanted to see whether the kinship, that exists between the two peoples, has had a role in the termination of confrontation.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Geographical and geopolitical position of Southeast Asia has a huge impact towards changes in the cultural, social, and political region of Southeast Asia as a whole (Tate, 1977; and Ricklefs, Lockhart & La, 2010). Indonesia and Malaysia, as the two countries with the most strategic geographical location and is bordered directly by sea and land, get a lot of outside influences which then forms a lot in common in terms of history and culture (Kahin, 1964; Gullick, 1967; Vlekke, 1967; Ongkili, 1985; Madjid ed., 1995; and Rolf, 2000).

But, the experience of colonialism different

impact on the formation of character and a different perception to national security concerns of each country (Guat, 1976; and Comber, 1983). This is reflected in the form of a different foreign policy, since the two countries gained independence in different ways: through Indonesian revolution and Malaysia through a process of peaceful transition (Kahin, 1972; Leifer, 1974; Singer, 1980; Rolf, 2000).

Because of the strategic geographical position of this reason, which then also turn Southeast Asia as an arena of struggle for ideological influence between the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc during the Cold War, since 1945 to 1990 (Lau ed., 2012). In the Cold War, Indonesia and Malaysia, a background of the different national interests, are in two opposing camps. As a result of the differences in the perception of the national interest at the time, plus their figures to the contrary between Indonesia and Malaya (Sukarno's anti-Western and Tunku Abdul Rahman's pro-Western), relations between the two countries are in the point of nadir and almost led to open warfare that is Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation events of 1963-1965 (Means, 1963; Adams, 1965; Bunnell, 1966; Legge, 1972; Ott, 1972; Ahmad, 1987; Wahid, 2001; and Liow, 2005).

Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia has close links with the international and regional situation at that time, the Cold War. The support of China and the Soviet Union to the confrontation politics of Indonesia were alarming the USA (United States of America). On the international stage, Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation has created a complex Cold War tensions between the USA and Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and China along with respective supporters in other hand (Kahin & Kahin, 1995; and Lau ed., 2012).

Indonesia – Malaysia's conflict exposes the USA in a complicated set of issues. On the one hand, the Cold War strategy requires that USA supported the British, but on the other hand, if the support was carried out hastily, it will steer Indonesia away from the West (Jones, 2002). That is why, in the conflict Indonesia Malaysia, seen the difference in attitude

between the British and the USA in the face of political confrontation of Indonesia.

USA prefer a persuasive approach towards Indonesia and encourage settlement of the conflict through negotiations, while the British prefer an aggressive approach, the tough stance Indonesia must be countered with military force, the British is willing to negotiate if Indonesia must first leave the confrontational attitude towards Malaysia (Gregorian, 1991).

Indonesia and Malaysia confrontation can be said to be an arena of rivalry or great power of attraction that time, the USA, Britain, and its allies; and the Soviet Union and China on the other side that competes in the context of the Cold War (Derkach, 1965; Saravanamuttu, 1990; and Kahin & Kahin, 1995). Policy of confrontation of Indonesia has brought Indonesia on foreign policy and militant anti-Western robust marked with Indonesia on the organization of the United Nations, and form its own block with China, North Vietnam, and North Korea (Jakarta – Beijing – Hanoi – Pyongyang).

There are some diplomatic efforts made by the international community to end the conflict did not produce positive results, so that the confrontation continues (Wani, Suwirta & Fayeye, 2013). Associated with one of the stages of conflict resolution, efforts to find solutions have led the mediators to bridge the differences between the warring factions. Mediators who appear to originate from the USA, Japan and Thailand, which are actively involved in facilitating meetings between Indonesia and Malaysia (Llewelyn, 2005).

The interesting thing to observe is an effort of the Indonesian side to be able to negotiate directly with the British, not with Malaysia (Dennis & Grey, 1996; Easter, 2004; and French, 2011), one thing that until now may not be widely known by most of the public in Indonesia today. When seen the spirit of his era at the time, Sukarno succeeded in burning the heroism of thousands of young volunteers from all over Indonesia to be deployed on the border of Kalimantan, conducted a campaign *Ganyang Malaysia* (Kroef, 1963; and Cribb, 1992);

and gather demonstrations of militants who revile Britain and the USA would not believe that the Indonesian side sought negotiating with the enemy, even as the party that has initiative (Jones, 1971; and Farram, 2014).

Why Indonesian government not choose to negotiate directly with Malaysia? That is something that is also interesting. It can be assessed that the British formed Malaysia, and when it was believed that the source of this conflict with Malaysia is the United Kingdom, so the Britain could solve the conflict (Easter, 2004; and French, 2011). With the British meet in secret, their expected completion in secret that can save Indonesia.

In the midst of the negotiations deadlock and escalating a conflict that elements of the Indonesian military, particularly the army, began to worry about the confrontation has a negative impact on the social, economic, and political matters. Confrontation is considered more advantageous position of the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or Indonesian Communist Party) with actions to mobilize thousands of volunteers in the struggle for West Irian (Hanrahan, 1971; and Bijl, 2007).

In confrontation politics with Malaysia, the majority party in Indonesia started to feel the war was futile, it is not clear what exactly is contested. Besides facing is a nation that historically has historical and cultural ties that closely. The emergence of doubts about the true meaning of war or conflict has prompted the initiative among Army officers, like Ahmad Yani and Suharto (Crouch, 1978; and Soeharto, 1991). A secret meeting of Indonesian military mission cannot be separated from the support groups Indonesian political refugees in Malaysia (James & Small, 1971).

Starting from the groundbreaking group of army officers, and with the help of the Indonesian political refugees in Malaysia, there was a variety of direct negotiations between the two parties. The dispute that has lasted for more than 33 months, can be resolved through negotiations between the two days: Adam Malik of Indonesia and Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia in Bangkok, Thailand, on 29 May – 1 June 1966 (*Utusan Malaysia*, 2/6/1966; *Kompas*, 3/6/1966;

Malik, 1978; and Katsumata, 2003). Furthermore, the results of the negotiations in Bangkok ratified by the Jakarta Accord, in August 1966 (Malik, 1978; Wanandi, 2001; and Katsumata, 2003).

There is one most important thing that can be taken as a lesson for the two nations of Indonesia and Malaysia in the settlement process of confrontation, the two nations allied, could resolve the conflict, which lasted for approximately three years by way of the Malay or Asia (Wallenstein, 2002; and Suwirta, 2010). Quoting the statement of Adam Malik, shortly after the signing of the Recovery Relations between Indonesia and Malaysia in Jakarta, on 11 August 1966, he said as follows:

[...] from this moment, we open a new page and clean in the history of the two nations, neither side wins or loses, the victory will be on the Malay race, clumps of a great nation in Southeast Asia, where nations of Indonesia and Malaysia, including in it (cited in *Suara Malaysia*, 18/8/1966).

Quoted by Adam Malik, reinforcing evidence that the completion of the Malaysia – Indonesia confrontation, Indonesia can be done quickly rather than by using conventional methods or generally used in an international conflict settlement (*cf* Malik, 1978; Wanandi, 2001; Katsumata, 2003; and Wani, Suwirta & Fayeye, 2013). As expressed by Adam Malik (1978) that to achieve the approval process, Indonesia and Malaysia have ruled all disciplines of diplomatic usually in force, they are directly related to each other and talk from the heart of prudence, and this agreement is a deliberation a sincere between two brothers to solve a problem together (Malik, 1978). According to Adam Malik, this is clear evidence that “Asian problem should be resolved by the Asian nation itself, this is an Asian way” (*cf* Malik, 1978; and Katsumata, 2003).

The successful completion of peaceful confrontation cannot be separated from some of the driving factors that are related to one another. Event separation of Singapore from the Federation State of Malaysia and the events of the 30th September 1965 uprising

in Indonesia had an incredible impact for confrontation (Crouch, 1978; Hart, 2009; and Ming, 2011). Although there have been direct negotiations secretly conducted since late September 1964, but both instances were the most powerful driving force for ending the confrontation, essentially events of 30th September 1965 uprising in Indonesia (Sutter, 1966; and Kroef, 1970).

By leveraging a network of friends and brotherhood, the peace feelers from the Indonesian army have managed to find parties, who appear to have the same thoughts with them. Through the help of Des Alwi, fugitive Indonesian living in Malaysia, which was once a school friend of Tun Abdul Razak in the Britain, the peace feelers from Indonesia successfully met and then dialogue with Tun Abdul Razak and his group who also have the desire with them (Nordin, 2008). Putting aside the usual diplomatic procedures for use, both groups then conduct secret meetings to discuss the possibility of conflict resolution that is acceptable to both parties (Weinstein, 1969; and Wani, Suwirta & Fayeye, 2013).

Successful negotiation of the termination of the conflict cannot be separated from the role of civilian leaders of Indonesia, such as Adam Malik and Des Alwi. It could be said that Des Alwi acted as a liaison between the two groups, who want to have a meeting; and Adam Malik is a reliable negotiator in the final round of negotiations (Malik, 1978; and Nordin, 2008). Thanks to the agility in negotiating, clever icebreaker, Indonesia-Malaysia conflict complicated issue, only through two days of talks in Bangkok, Thailand.

So, in the process of termination of the conflict, military and civilian groups work together and this has to be one of the key successes of the termination of the conflict peacefully (Crouch, 1978; and Arto, 1989). It can be said that reconciliation initiative came from the army, the civil groups to help liaison, and negotiator in the informal and formal negotiations are conducted by the civilian and military support.

In addition to internal factors as described above, acceleration of the termination of the

actual confrontation also cannot be separated from external factors that occurred at that time. In this case, from the Malaysian side, external factor is the change in British policy. The fiscal crisis in the UK (United Kingdom) and Singapore from Malaysia discharge events make England think of the costs of the deployment of military forces in Southeast Asia, especially in the confrontation (Easter, 2004; and French, 2011). This is why the British actively encouraged Malaysia to hold talks with Indonesia to end the confrontation.

Hidayat Mukmin (1991) said that the secret negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia took place without the knowledge of the British (Mukmin, 1991). But, based on sources that I can mainly sources, the Britain showed that Malaysia always report what they would do in relation to negotiations with Indonesia. It is clear that Britain approved the secret negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia, but the British is not directly involved, so its role as an adviser (Chee, 1974; Easter, 2004; and French, 2011).

On the other hand, the Indonesian side indirectly there is an external factor that is their indirect pressure from the USA towards Lieutenant General Suharto as new real leader in Indonesia. USA declared that it would resume its economic and military aid towards Indonesia, if Indonesia is willing to end the confrontation with Malaysia (Said, 1984; Kahin & Kahin, 1995; and Simpson, 2008). At that time, Indonesia was in dire need of economic assistance from outside to overcome the severe economic downturn (Weinstein, 1976; and Nordin, 2008).

Answering the main question of this study, why it can be quick and easy? There is one important thing that can answer, that is the important role of the kinship between the two countries. Termination of, not apart from the dialogue and it is possible to end up with a good and peaceful, because of the element of kinship (Liow, 2004; and Chong, 2012).

Related conflict ended quickly, Malaysian Foreign Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, just said that "this is the way of us, the Asian way, in solving the problem" (MoFA Malaysia, 1971; and Nordin, 2008). Even he and his colleagues in Malaysia and Indonesia stated

that the confrontation is conflict between the Communist and non-Communist elements, which implicitly about to give justification that the confrontation was not a conflict between the two allied countries (Hatta, 1965; MoFA Malaysia, 1971; Shafie, 1982; Leifer, 1983; and Nordin, 2008).

Behind this process, of course, the background of kinship was one factor that makes uninterrupted communication between the two countries. The main character who became the important actors in the negotiation in Bangkok, Thailand – such as Adam Malik and Des Alwi of Indonesia and Tun Abdul Razak and M. Ghazali Shafie of Malaysia – were distant cousins and soulmate (Nordin, 2008; and Chong, 2012).

How to Indonesia and Malaysia resolve the issue when it was, which uses the concept of kinship's diplomacy, later became the basis for ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) countries to develop mechanisms of dialogue in resolving their problems. How to resolve the conflict by relying on dialogue and continuous negotiation could lead to mutual trust between the leaders of those countries (Ott, 1967; Irvine, 1982; and Vatikiotis, 1996).

At least a lot of cultural elements such as consensus, brotherhood, deliberation, and informal meetings are popular in Malaysian and Indonesian society and to be a way to resolve differences (Wallenstein, 2002; and Liow, 2004). In this way, then, often known also as the "ASEAN way"; so, in other words, this being a strategic culture that developed ASEAN (Shafie, 1971; Tilman, 1987; and Vatikiotis, 1996).

In the context of the region, the relevance of the concept of kinship, thus, as a tool and mechanism to encourage dialogue with useful, so expect the conflicts that occur between the two nations can be resolved either by lifting backs the spirit of brotherhood (Liow, 2004; and Chong, 2012).

CONCLUSION

In the end, the study noticed that the kinship is a concept that remains important and useful in the Indonesia-Malaysia relations. However, kinship needs to be seen in proportion and context, and will

not necessarily be seen as an emotional and nostalgic. In a proportional and contextual understanding, kinship has no significance in the context of state sovereignty, a concept that is very important two independent nation-states.

However, there is the potential that can be developed from the concept of kinship, primarily as a tool or mechanism in international diplomacy. Kinship can help the process of dialogue to defuse conflicts and promote cooperation. Kinship is the foundation to begin a constructive dialogue.²

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²**Statement:** I, hereby, declare that this article is my original academic work, it is not product of plagiarism, due to all sources used and cited in the analysis are showed clearly and available in the References. This article is also not submitted, reviewed, and published yet in other scholarly journals.

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Indonesia and Malaysia: One Kin Two Nation-States

(Source: <http://poskotanews.com>, 15/1/2017)

As a reality, there is no doubt there is a kinship between the two countries: Indonesia and Malaysia. Both countries have a blood relation (brotherhood), culture, and family relationships; and, therefore, often referred to as allied countries. Malay cultural similarities between the two countries in the felt in almost all areas of "Melayu" (Malay) in Malaysia and in Indonesia, such as Sumatera, Kalimantan, and partly most Sulawesi.