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Friction in MASYUMI: A Historical Studies on Internal Conflict Event of Islamic Party in Indonesia, 1945-1960

ABSTRACT: As one of the modern Islamic organizations, MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association), in its development, cannot be separated from the internal dynamics. The dynamics influenced toward the pattern of the struggle that it did. The differences of MASYUMI's characteristics are the main reasons for the friction. Besides, internal political interests became the other causes of MASYUMI's discordance. Different characters and their political interests led to the domination of one group in MASYUMI. The political domination impacts on the integrity of the members in it. This study tries to elaborate of friction in MASYUMI as modern political party in Indonesia, since 1940s to 1960s in Indonesian political landscape. The method of study is a qualitative research, especially historical method, in which the Heuristic, Critics, Analysis, and Historiography are the steps in historical research. The findings show that as a result of these frictions in MASYUMI, the authority and dignity of the organization has decreased. MASYUMI was no longer become covered Islamic organizations, as well as on the initial formation. Many Muslims did not want to join again with MASYUMI. Inequalities in the management of distributing the resources unevenly became the early setback that MASYUMI up cannot be glimpsed again by Muslims, either personally or collectively.

KEY WORDS: Modern Islamic Party; Internal Conflict; Domination; Political Interests; Indonesian Political Landscape.

INTRODUCTION

As one of the modern Islamic organizations, MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association), in its development, cannot be separated from the internal dynamics. The dynamics influenced toward the pattern of the struggle that it did. The differences of MASYUMI's characteristics are the main reasons for the friction. Besides, internal political interests became the other

causes of MASYUMI's discordance. Different characters and their political interests led to the domination of one group in MASYUMI. The political domination impacts on the integrity of the members in it.

As a result of these frictions in MASYUMI, the authority and dignity of the organization has decreased. MASYUMI was no longer become covered Islamic organizations, as well as on the initial formation. Many Muslims did not want

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ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS THAT SUPPORTS MASYUMI

According to Deliar Noer (1987), the position of Muslims, at the beginning of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia in August 1945, were unfavorable compared to their neutral position religion. This was the position of those who were weak in BPUPKI (*Badan Penyelidikan dan Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* or Investigative Body for Indonesian Independence Preparation). The defeat of the Islamists with the abolition of the Jakarta Charter in 1945 brought them together in the same boat (Noer, 1987:45). They began to think that a political party can become an umbrella for all the Islamic organizations at the time (Thaba, 1986:158).

Because of such conditions that, in September 1945, a number of Islamic leaders in Jakarta, including Abdoel Kahar Moezakir, Wahid Hasjim, and Mohammad Roem, decided to change the MASYUMI (*Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association) formed during the reign of the Japanese Army in Indonesia (1942-1945), which was still there but passive, into the party organization.¹

A month after Islamist leaders had decided to form a Muslim party, the government issued a notification or letter number X that contains the suggestion to form political parties in Indonesia. The announcement was welcomed by the intellectual leaders of the Islamic community, including Dr. Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, stating that Muslims were obliged to organize the power and political power in a container, so that it could carry

out its work in the political field (cited in Kahin, 1980:192).

To realize these desires, on 7-8 November 1945, at the House of *Mua'limin Muhammadiyah* in Yogyakarta, was held the Indonesian Islamic Conference or *Muktamar*. The conference was attended by leaders of Islamic organizations, such as NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or Awakening of Islamic Scholars), *Muhammadiyah* (Followers of Prophet Muhammad) organization, PSII (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* or Indonesian Islamic League Party), PERSIS (*Persatuan Islam* or Islamic Union), and PII (*Partai Islam Indonesia* or Indonesian Islamic Party). Through intense debate, finally the conference, and through voting 52 versus 50, decided that: (1) MASYUMI is the only Islamic political parties in Indonesia; and (2) MASYUMI is the one, which will fight for the fate of Indonesian Muslims in the national political stage (Wirjosandjojo, n.y.).

The composition of the personnel involved in the management of the MASYUMI was all representatives of Islamic organizations before and after independence, in which each organization has a different background of intellectual traditions. Following the opinion of Fachri Ali (1987), who stated that the intellectual tradition of Islamic organizations joined in MASJUMI were grouped into two groups of traditions of Islamic thought, namely the Islamic traditionalism and modernism (Ali, 1987:85). Traditionalism group was represented by NU, while a group of Islamic modernism was represented by the representatives of reformist West Sumatra and *Muhammadiyah* organization in Java.

Meanwhile, according to George McTurnan Kahin (1980), the pattern of religious thought embraced by leaders of organizations or leaders of factions that joined in MASYUMI grouped into two. This group is composed of the progressives and the conservatives (Kahin, 1980:158). The first group is the religious socialists, who are taking inspiration from the teachings of the reformists from South-West Asian or Middle East origin, such as Jamaluddin Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. This group is represented by names, such as Mohammad Natsir, Syafrudin Prawiranegara, Mohammad Roem, Yusuf Wibisono, and Abu Hanifah. The second group is represented by

¹In 1937, the organization's leaders set up a federation of Islamic organization, namely MIAI (*Majlis Islam A'la Indonesia* or Islamic Council *a la Indonesia*) in Surabaya, East Java. Then, on the orders of the Japanese occupation in Indonesia, MIAI was dissolved and instead formed a new organization called MASYUMI (*Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association). For further information the MASYUMI in the time of Japanese occupation in Indonesia, see Harry J. Benda (1980) and B.J. Bolland (1990).

leaders of the older generation, especially from the group of NU clerics and some of the older generation of leaders of the SI (*Syarekat Islam* or Islamic League).

According George McTurnan Kahin (1980), MASYUMI formation on 7 November 1945, can be seen as an attempt to unite Muslims. MASYUMI established was used as a political party unity for all Muslims regardless of their background Indonesian religious thought, race, social education, and the economy (Kahin, 1980). In it, together individuals and organizations before the war, each claw and involved fighting which sometimes fierce. Organizations that enter into MASYUMI not only from Islamic organizations, such as *Muhammadiyah* that develops renewal, but also a counterpart organization, the NU which it was founded in 1926 to oppose reformism movement, such as *Muhammadiyah* and PERSIS become exponents.

MASYUMI also bring together in a single shade of the parties involved in internal conflicts of PSII before Indonesia's independence. At the time of the formation of MASYUMI, in 7-8 November 1945, met the leaders of the PSII's faction before Indonesian independence; this time, they sat together cooperate in the new party. Important positions in MASYUMI newly occupied by Haji Agus Salim and Moehamad Roem, both of whose were never removed his membership from PSII in 1937, for opposing the movement of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso's politics (Kahin, 1980; and Noer, 1982).

But, in a development that not so long ago, a new MASYUMI was not able to maintain its ability to nurture and sympathize interests of the diverse Islamic groups. Personality variety MASYUMI new membership made it difficult to maintain party unity. Different factions with political and religious views different also have to co-exist in it. One of the first signs of the difficulties it faced was split of MASYUMI in 1947 were marked by the release of PSII, and stand again as a political party of its own. After that the NU congress in Palembang in 1952 stated that NU was also out from MASYUMI and reinvent itself as *Jam'iyah* (religious organizations) into a political party (Noer, 1987).

THE CAUSE OF PSII'S DISCHARGING FROM MASYUMI IN 1947

Discord or conflict in MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association), in 1947, based on lines similar to the conflicts that had torn the PSII (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* or Indonesian Islamic League Party) before Indonesia's independence. The characters involved in the separation of PSII from MASYUMI, it is the same figures as involved as they play an important role in conflicts of PSII before Indonesia's independence. Those in charge of the re-establishment of PSII as a separation party were W. Wondoamiseno and Arudji Kartawinata. Both were used to support Abikusno Tjokrosujoso in disagreement about the political migration in 1935 and 1936, which ultimately resulted in the sacking of the faction led by Haji Agus Salim and Moehamad Roem (Noer, 1982).

Why PSII out from MASYUMI in 1947, the primary factors, according to the authors, are for not being the arrival of opportunities for factions of PSII to sit in the Ministry Cabinet (*cf* Soemaryo ed., 1978:68; and Noer, 1987). This makes the leaders of PSII was not satisfied, especially W. Wondoamiseno and Arudji Kartawinata, both of whose are national figures, before Indonesian independence, positions are by no means in MASYUMI after Indonesian independence. They are included in the leadership of *Hezbollah* (Army of God) and *Sabilillah* (Way of God), who have less political influence in decision making. So, when business formation of Amir Syarifuddin, as Prime Minister, formed Ministry Cabinet in 1947, who wants to involve the Islamic community but rejected by MASYUMI, the leaders of PSII welcomed and they were willing to sit in the Ministry Cabinet that it forms the logical consequence of the PSII should quit from MASYUMI (Kahin, 1980; and Noer, 1987:46).

In view of George McTurnan Kahin (1980), events discharge leader of PSII from MASYUMI and reestablish PSII as a political party of its own to be the attitude of political opportunism on the part of A. Wondoamiseno and Arudji Kartawinata (Kahin, 1980). According to C. Van Dijk (1993) also PSII long have separated themselves from MASYUMI partly, because

of political opportunism and it always did not approve of the liberal philosophy to make progress in this organization. With this action, PSII allowed the formation of a new cabinet led by Amir Syarifudin, and they were rewarded two Ministers' chairs to help them (Kahin, 1980; and Van Dijk, 1993).

Around 1947, members of PSII before Indonesia's independence, or those remaining of this organization at the time of the Dutch colony (1900-1942), continuously losing its influence in MASYUMI for elements that will determine his face in the years after the Muslim politician's pragmatic better educated, such as Mohammad Natsir and Mohammad Roem. Bids submitted Amir Syarifuddin, thus, giving them the leaders of the old PSII, it was good opportunity to separate themselves from MASYUMI, which they develop in ways that were not desired. By forming a new PSII, they expect to regain the leadership of the Muslims and to control it back to the right path (Van Dijk, 1993:75-76).

So, based on the above description that, in general, the internal conflicts of MASYUMI in 1947 was due to the rationing mechanism position or political role is not going well, in the sense of satisfying each of the parties or elements that form the fusion in MASYUMI. Internal conflict in the beginning of PSII's discharge from MASYUMI in 1947, and then NU 1952, reinforces this thesis. Nevertheless, the possibility of other factors that cause, or even accelerate the emergence of conflicts and divisions, were not non-existent. For the case of PSII, other reasons out of MASYUMI is the assumption that leadership of MASYUMI considered soft in the face of the revolution, but especially with the Dutch; and, therefore, is said to be willing to compromise with the Dutch (Noer, 1987:76).

Indeed, some leaders of MASYUMI, like Mohammad Natsir and Mohammad Roem, participated in the Syahrir Cabinet, and in negotiations with the Dutch government to run the wisdom of half the invisible being soft and compromising, MASYUMI party itself is not wisdom Cabinet approved the Ambassador. In this context, W. Wondoamiseno and Arudji Kartawinata were including groups who criticized the attitude of this software, and demanded harsh attitude shown towards the

Dutch. It was also Chairman of MASYUMI, Mr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, demanding the same thing from the government, but Sukiman Wirjosandjojo including those that was less favored by some circles PSII before Indonesia's independence (Noer, 1987:77).

The other factors, why PSII was out from MASYUMI, were the insistence of some old people of PSII in the area on their leaders to immediately re-establish the party's center. Maybe this pressure because they do not see the figures of PSII has an important position in MASYUMI, except Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, so that they see as a new party, MASYUMI underprivileged sympathize interests of the parties before Indonesia's independence, particularly against the interests of PSII in the arena of national parties (*cf* Kahin, 1980; and Noer, 1987).

After PSII established as a political party in 1947, the leadership of PSII issued *ma'lumat* (announcement) which says that the actual PSII has no dispute with MASYUMI. And he gives the reason that the incoming Cabinet, PSII solely based on the responsibility to the country in facing a very worrying tensions, so that the party responsible for overcoming it.²

THE CAUSE NU'S DISCHARGING FROM MASYUMI IN 1952

The PSII (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* or Indonesian Islamic League Party) discharge events of 1947 did not really affect the MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association)'s trip, because his strength comparing to PSII itself. Weakening MASYUMI as an Islam political force is sensed again after NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or Awakening of Islamic Scholars) pledged themselves out of the party in 1952 (Noer, 1987; and Wahid, 1999).

In congress in Palembang, South Sumatera, in 1952, NU reinvented itself as *jami'iyah*, a religious social organizations, into a political party. At the time of this, NU became a political party and member of Parliament who defected to the new party only eight people, but NU sure about his great. NU's confidence is evidenced by history, in which the 1955

²See, for example, news on "Ma'lumat PSII" in newspaper of *Merdeka*. Jakarta: 16 Djuli 1947.

General Elections amount to eight people jumped to forty five people in Parliament (Ma'arif, 1994:167).

According to Anwar Haryono (1997), one of the exponents of MASYUMI, the factors exactly NU out from MASYUMI was unclear. But, Anwar Haryono estimate that the signs of split in the MASYUMI have emerged since the President Soekarno pointed Sidik Djojokusarto of PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* or Indonesian National Party) and Prawoto Mangkusasmito of MASYUMI as the preparation of cabinet formation. Different habits that have been going on for these limiting talks on forming a cabinet only with leaders of political parties, this time Bung Karno felt the need to discuss the issue with *Rais Am* (Chairman) of NU, K.H. (*Kyai Haji*) Abdul Wahab Hasbullah (Haryono, 1997:114-115).

Although K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah denied having talked about the preparation of the cabinet with Bung Karno or President Soekarno, but openly he has submitted its proposals regarding the cabinet.³ President Soekarno asked Sukiman Wirjosandjo to become Prime Minister, Abu Hanifah as Foreign Minister, Zainal Arifin as Secretary of Defense, and K.H. Wahid Hasyim as a Minister of Religion Affairs.

If the latter was rejected as the candidates, there were other candidates from NU, namely K.H. Maskur, K.H. Faturahman, Haji Mustari (Regent of Tuban in East Java), and Mohammed Mahiin (Regent of Kediri in East Java). Additional chairs backed up to the origin of the major parties (*ibidem* with footnote 3).

NU actual discharge from MASYUMI in 1952 not only because of external factors, such as those described by Anwar Haryono (1997), but also because no matter how strong of interference from the outside against a party when the party's internal condition was very strong; it is predicted that the party would not be so easily swayed in maintaining its presence. The seeds of disunity, in fact, come from the internal MASYUMI itself (Haryono, 1997).

There are some facts that can be used as a reason for it. *First*, NU did not agree to changes in the formulation of the *Syura* (Advisory

Council in AD/ART (*Anggaran Dasar/ Anggaran Rumah Tangga* or Organization Consitution/Law) of MASYUMI in the 14th Congress, dated 15 to 18 December 1945, in Yogyakarta. NU considers that by making just the *Majlis Syura*, or Advisory Body, the organization did not provide a decent place for the scholars highly respected in the organizational environment of NU. *Syura* council members were mostly from NU, while these changes spearheaded MASYUMI figures from *Muhammadiyah* (Followers of Prophet Muhammad)'s organization (Noer, 1987; Haryono, 1997; and Wahid, 1999).

Against this change, K.H. Syaefudin Zuhri (1981), who at that time included young leaders of NU, said as follows:

The organizational structure of the MASYUMI party did not reflect the democratic deliberation in the system, so that wisdom was more focused on the political considerations of the *Majlis Syura Fatwa* [...]. That's why even though MASYUMI boycott the formation of the Amir Syarifuddin's Cabinet on 3 Juli 1947 in Yogyakarta, the name of PSII, under the leadership of Arudji Kartawinata-Wondoamiseno broke the boycott – difficult to understand, due to friction within MASYUMI, four months after the formation of Amir Syarifuddin Cabinet boycotted by the party. MASYUMI sudden change its political point of view, willing to enter the Cabinet, which was boycotted, by putting Mr. Syamsudin as Deputy Prime Minister (Zuhri, 1981:640).

MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association) influx into the Cabinet of Amir Syarifuddin; it means in the cabinet, there were two Islamic political parties: MASYUMI and PSII (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* or Indonesian Islamic League Party). This was perceived by NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or Awakening of Islamic Scholars) as a betrayal of the original agreement, which is "just an Islamic political party". Even NU accused, the deal is the only political party of political Islam and a story that would be used by anyone to whom (Noer, 1987; Haryono, 1997; and Wahid, 1999).

NU again responded this conclusion with very concern. K.H. (*Kyai Haji*) Syaefudin Zuhri made the comment it, as follows:

NU most feeling the effects of the imbalance in the organizational structure of MASYUMI

³Interview with Anwar Haryono, one of the exponents of MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association), in Jakarta, on 17th May 1994.

perceived to be fair, if it may be called as an unfair political dominance in the management (board of directors), and the political positions that should be qualified (in the Cabinet and the House of Representatives). If the dominance of a dishonorable despite the large groups to small groups, how well if done by a small group, how anyway if performed by a minority to the majority (Zuhri, 1981:641).

Second, the direct cause or factor that NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or Awakening of Islamic Scholars) discharged from MASYUMI was associated with the formation of the cabinet, that was after Sidik Djojokusarto of PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* or Indonesian National Party) and Prawoto Mangkusasmito of MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association) restored their mandate to the President Soekarno, on 19 March 1952; and then Bung Karno appointed Mr. Wilopo of PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* or Indonesian National Party) as a formation of cabinet (Noer, 1987; and Haryono, 1997).

MASYUMI again pointed Prawoto Mangkusasmito to face Wilopo. Four days before Wilopo designated as cabinet formateur, K.H. (*Kyai Haji*) Abdul Wahab Hasbullah send advice, in the form of a letter to Prawoto Mangkusasmito, reminding him of the magnitude of dedication, influence, and position of Sukiman Wirjosandjojo in nature MASYUMI entirely; and, therefore, should Sukiman Wirjosandjojo believed to be the Prime Minister or the Deputy Prime Minister on cabinet prepared (cited in Haryono, 1997:116).

According to K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah, every effort to put Sukiman Wirjosandjojo outside the cabinet, it would cause a massive split in MASYUMI. And then K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah expressed regret that the desire to convey the matter to the board meeting of MASYUMI cannot be done, because he was not a member of the leadership. As a member of the *Majlis Syura* (Advisory Board) of MASYUMI, K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah claimed not to express an opinion that in the *Majlis Syura*, because the problem did not involve the Islamic religious law (*cf* Noer, 1987; and Haryono, 1997).

The reason of NU proposes Sukiman Wirjosandjojo become the Prime Minister or the Deputy of the Prime Minister was due to

he known to be more able to sympathize from *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) group in political behavior rather than Mohammad Natsir, also known as PERSIS (*Persatuan Islam* or Islamic Union) figure, an organization that was often involved in debates with NU pertaining *khilafiyah* (little matters, not essential in Islamic law) before Indonesia's independence (Noer, 1982; and Wahid, 1999).

It is interesting to note here that Sukiman Wirjosandjojo underprivileged in religious understanding, because he was dependent upon the NU scholars in this matter. Thus, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo was relatively easy to talk with NU on the question of the composition of the cabinet, especially regarding the position of Minister of Religious Affairs. While Mohammad Natsir, on the other hand, in matters of religious knowledge can be considered the equal with the NU scholars at that time. So, Mohammad Natsir, therefore, was very difficult to talk with NU (*ibidem* with footnote 3).

On 20 March 1952, K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah resent the letters. This time addressed to the Chairman of MASYUMI: Mohammad Natsir and also to Prawoto Mangkusasmito. In a letter this time, NU, according to K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah, filed a lawsuit regarding the composition of the cabinet. He, then, gave two days to the leadership of MASYUMI to give a positive answer to his letter. If not, again according to K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah, "I asked forgiveness and very sorry, just try and error, in striving to achieve these demands through MASYUMI will no longer". On the same day, Political Council in NU Executive Board has made the considerations, in a letter to the leadership of MASYUMI, numbered 5/4/MPP/1952, and reiterated his support for the demands of K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah (Zuhri, 1981; Noer, 1987; Haryono, 1997; and *ibidem* with footnote 3).

On 23 March 1952, MASYUMI leaders held the meetings. In one of the meetings, K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah presented and reiterated his stance. He, then, said that "It is difficult to create unity and cohesion, if justice is not served" (cited in Haryono, 1997:115). Meetings were not also explicitly reject or accept the demands of NU, then issued a five-

point of consideration, namely: (1) the party leaders of MASYUMI not intend to rule out candidates for Minister of Religious Affairs as stated by any family of MASYUMI; (2) the party leaders did not simply accept or reject any proposed by NU, but submit the names of candidates for Ministers of Religious Affairs was the formateur of Wilopo to select one of the candidates who submitted it; (3) anyone of the candidates from MASYUMI, the selected formation will be agreed by MASYUMI; (4) if formateur wants MASYUMI make selection, Prawoto Mangkusasmito will bring back to the Executive Board of MASJUMI for meeting; and (5) choice MASYUMI candidates by the leadership will be based on a majority vote (cited in Haryono, 1997).

Again the results of the meeting related to five-points, NU did not accept it. On 26 March 1952, K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah of NU met Wilopo to convey the aspirations of the composition of the cabinet. According to the testimony of Anwar Haryono, action of K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah of NU met Wilopo of PNI became angered the leaders of MASYUMI, because of that it led MASYUMI decision is made to no longer pay of NU desire (*ibidem* with footnote 3).

And because NU reject the five-points decision of the leadership meeting of MASYUMI, the party decided not to submit the selection of candidates for the Minister of Religious Affairs to formateur of cabinet, but will be determined based on the custom has been in force in the party, which is through voting (Haryono, 1997). Based on this decision, the eight people declared a candidate for Minister of Religious Affairs from MASYUMI, namely K.H. Maskur, K.H. Faturahman, K.H. Ilyas Yakub, K.H. Faqih Usman, Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo, H. Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Oesman Raliby, and dr. Ali Akbar. Result of the vote was K.H. Faqih Usman won a majority, as many as five votes. Thus, K.H. Faqih Usman of *Muhammadiyah* was declared as the sole candidate for Minister of Religious Affairs from MASYUMI (Haryono, 1997:116). Then, K.H. Faqih Usman submitted to the Cabinet formateurs: Wilopo – Prawoto Mangkusasmito; and they impose to choice K.H. Faqih Usman and deleted NU candidate to

occupy as Minister of Religious Affairs (Feith, 1964:138).

The election K.H. Faqih Usman of *Muhammadiyah* became Minister of Religious Affairs makes NU disappointed. On 5 to 6 April 1952, the meeting of NU Advisory and Executive Board in Jombang, East Java decided to get out from MASYUMI. PB (*Pengurus Besar* or Executive Board) of NU decision was confirmed by the NU Congress which was held on 26 April until 1 May 1952 in Palembang, South Sumatera (Noer, 1987; and Wahid, 1999).

Sound of decisions secession from MASYUMI was formulated in a tone that seemed moderate in the field of organizational decisions, namely: (1) Agreeing with 61 voices agree, nine voted against, and seven abstained will sound decision – PB NU dated 5-6 April 1952, that NU organizationally separate themselves from MASYUMI and proposed on MASYUMI in order to reorganize itself into a federative entity; and (2) Approve unanimously PB-NU proposal form the outlines of the organizational implementation of separation of MASYUMI (Feith, 1964:139).

According to Deliar Noer (1987), NU's discharging from MASYUMI driven by two motives, namely: disagreement NU clerics would MASYUMI tendency that did not respect the clergy; and political motives were demanding the post of Chair of Religious Affairs' Ministry (Noer, 1987). Meanwhile, according to K.H. Syaefudin Zuhri (1981), the demands for the issue seat of Religious Affairs Ministry just last outbreak, due to previously NU repeatedly let down, because of various demands were not granted (Zuhri, 1981).

Thus, the seeds of friction in MASYUMI were actually the implications of the allocation of roles that have been designed previously. For example, NU stronghold occupied the *Majlis Syura* (Advisory Board), which is often just struggling with purely religious matters, thus get a less political role; while the Western upbringing, also *Muhammadiyah* organization's leaders, occupying the executive officers of the camp, the day to day running wheel stewardship of MASYUMI (Feith, 1964; and Noer, 1987).

The discharged of PSII in 1947 and NU in 1952 from MASYUMI, one may see that the

release of NU from MASYUMI, as NU leaders act, was opportunistically. But, for PSII and NU, it is the best way to rid themselves of discontent of its *jamaah* (followers), both political and religious in MASYUMI. For the case of NU, for example, after becoming a party, he managed to spread its wings to various regions throughout the country, especially after his position in the cabinet assured. NU dominance in the Ministry of Religious Affairs has also facilitated the spread of this party (Zuhri, 1981; and Noer, 1987).

MASYUMI'S INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL CONDITION OF POST-CONFLICT

Since the release of NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or Awakening of Islamic Scholars) from MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association) in 1952, the MASYUMI was then becoming weaker organizational conditions.⁴ This can also be seen when MASYUMI involved in the General Election of 1955. When it was conducted, MASYUMI cannot deny that he must compete with NU in gaining a voice in Parliament, which was essentially equally as the Islamic parties. Although MASYUMI had tried to keep the Islamic parties running alone with hold regular meetings between the top leaders of the party, namely Mohammad Natsir, Wahid Hasyim, and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, but the meeting did not continue and did not also produce a unanimous agreement to maintain cooperation among fellow Muslim. This was also because one's most important figures, namely K.H. Wahid Hasyim was died on 19 April 1953 (Zuhri, 1981; and Noer, 1987).

Even, since the breakup between the Islamic parties, it was often strained relations between the Islamic parties, especially when things happen that cause the possibility of cabinet changes, or things that were concerned with the cabinet itself. In 1953, for example, Wilopo cabinet fell and was replaced by Ali Sastroamijoyo cabinet I (Noer, 1987:225). The main reason for the fall of the Wilopo cabinet was lack of cooperation between the two parties supporting this

cabinet, which is between MASYUMI and PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* or Indonesian National Party).

In this cabinet of Ali Sastroamijoyo, NU (after becoming political party) initially got three seats, then after a change of cabinet positions in the government, NU became stronger. In this cabinet, NU can get the political positions in government as Deputy Prime Minister I (Zainal Arifin), Minister of Home Affair (Mr. Sunaryo), Minister of Religious Affairs (K.H. Masykur), and Minister of Agriculture (Moh. Hanafiah). With respect to this first Ali Sastroamijoyo cabinet, MASYUMI became the opposition. With this event, the competition between NU and MASYUMI become a reality, even though at that time, NU in Parliament remains of eight people (Ma'arif, 1994:169).

Likewise, when the Cabinet of Ali Sastroamijoyo II, as a result of the 1955 General Election so broad support in Parliament, was not able to survive more than one year, even if he is supported by the major parties, namely PNI, NU, and MASYUMI. This was because the parties supporting the cabinet cannot work together. Judging from the number of Muslim representatives, who sit in the actual establishment of the government, they can be more giving toward wisdom in the cabinet. Their number was 12 out of 23 cabinet members (Noer, 1987:250). But the problems were they cannot work together, because of jealousy politics among them relapse as has happened before, that was when they were in the shade MASYUMI set up under the agreement and a common goal.

As a result of the release of PSII (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* or Indonesian Islamic League Party) and NU, MASYUMI political bargaining power at the national level was becoming weaker. Especially after the involvement MASYUMI figures in PRRI (*Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* or Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) in Sumatera and PERMESTA (*Perjuangan Semesta* or Total Struggle) in Sulawesi, position and bargaining power of this party was getting weaker over time (Leirissa, 1992).

Involvement peaks of MASYUMI figures in PRRI/PERMESTA in 1957/1958, it has

⁴As cited from a lot of news in *Harian Abadi*, a newspaper owned by MASYUMI in Jakarta, on 5 July 1952.

also been used as an excuse to convince President Soekarno, who was supported also by PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or Indonesian Communist Party), that MASYUMI as counter-revolutionary party and rebels. With so PKI also has had reason to urge President Soekarno to dissolve MASYUMI. Target PKI was a reality when MASYUMI and PSI (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia* or Indonesian Socialist Party), at the end of 1960, disappear from the political Indonesia, after being hit by Presidential Decree # 200/1960 on the dissolution of political parties in Indonesia (Noer, 1987).

CONCLUSION

The main cause of conflict in MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association) was due to an imbalance in the distribution of the resources owned by the party, so that it appeared one group to lord these sources, while most did not prevail against it. These sources range from the division of political roles. In this case, the reformists play a lot or mastering a political role which should be distributed fairly among the various elements or factions supporting MASYUMI. This was the implication of the organizational structure since its inception in MASYUMI.

The type of conflicts that occur in the event of a split in MASYUMI for 15 years, until 1960, can be broadly classified into two types, namely: the conflict was personal and subjective manners; and the conflict was impersonal and objective manners. Type the first conflict occurred between the figures of MASYUMI and the figures of PSII (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* or Indonesian Islamic League Party), especially the PSII leaders before Indonesia's independence (1945). The second type of conflict occurs between NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or Awakening of Islamic Scholars) and the top leadership of MASYUMI.


The post-split in MASYUMI, organizationally condition becomes weak, in terms of political bargaining power and in terms of membership and organization of the party. With these conditions make it easier for rival of MASYUMI to drop, especially PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or Indonesian

Communist Party); and in the final period of the Soekarno regime's leadership has been able to get rid of MASYUMI as his main rival through convincing argument of Soekarno. MASYUMI, then, was banned by President Soekarno in 1960.⁵

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⁵**Statement:** We, hereby, declare that this article is our own scholarly work; so, it is not a product of plagiarism, due to all sources that are cited in this article, we have shown in the References. This article is also not submitted, reviewed, or published in other scholarly journals yet.



One of the Books Related to MASYUMI in Indonesia
(Source: <http://www.nu.or.id>, 19/9/2016)

As one of the modern Islamic organizations, MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association), in its development, cannot be separated from the internal dynamics. The dynamics influenced toward the pattern of the struggle that it did. The differences of MASYUMI's characteristics are the main reasons for the friction. Besides, internal political interests became the other causes of MASYUMI's discordance. Different characters and their political interests led to the domination of one group in MASYUMI. The political domination impacts on the integrity of the members in it.